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CASE COMMENTS
The West Virginia court has held in actions to recover for
wrongful death, that the law of the place of the wrong rather than
the law of the forum govern the right of action in this state. Keesee
v. Atlantic Grayhound Corp., 120 W. Va. 201, 197 S.E. 522 (1938).
The West Virginia court later said that the substantive law of the
foreign jurisdiction controls the right to recover and that the ques-
tion of survivability of a cause of action was one of substantive law.
Tice v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. 144 W. Va. 24, 106
S.E.2d 107 (1958). These cases seem to indicate that West Virginia
would follow the majority, at least as to the procedural issue, and
be contra to the instant case.
By determining that the law of the place of the injury is
contrary to public policy of the forum and is procedural rather than
substantive, the court in the instant case concluded that the law
of the forum must be applied on the issue of damages. This view
tends to negate both the rationale of certain conflict of law rules
and the reason for their existance-namely, to prevent the outcome
of a lawsuit from differing according to the place chosen to institute
the suit. While the decision of the instant case is no doubt both
popular and benevolent, it seems to be an open invitation to forum
shopping. To avoid this, it seems that legislation need be enacted
either by New York to give a contract cause of action, or by the
Congress under the commerce power to provide that damage limi-
tations in common carrier accidents would be unlawful and void.
By these methods it would be possible to achieve the same laudable
results as the Kilberg and the instant cases without resorting to the
legal reasoning found here.
Earl Moss Curry, Jr.
Criminal Law-Conspiracy-Consistency Rule
X and D were indicted on several counts, including criminal
conspiracy, and were tried jointly. D entered a plea of guilty to
the charges of conspiracy. He was sentenced on October 20, 1958.
Previously, on October 8, 1958, X had been tried on the conspiracy
charge and acquitted. D served one sentence and brought habeas
corpus to be released from serving the second consecutive sentence.
The lower court granted the writ and P, the warden, appealed. Held,
affirmed. In order for a court to have jurisdiction in a case it
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must have jurisdiction of the person, of the subject matter, and to
render the particular judgment which was given. In order to meet
the latter requirement the court must have the power to pronounce
the judgment under the law and the existing facts. The acquittal
of X deprived the trial court of such jurisdiction over D on the charge
of criminal conspiracy. Eyman v. Deutsch, 373 P.2d 716 (Ariz.
1962).
A conspiracy is a combination between two or more persons
to accomplish an unlawful act, or to do a lawful act by unlawful
means. Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197 (1893). Because
of this definition it is generally assumed that logical consistency
would prohibit the conviction of a person for a conspiracy unless
there is at least one other conspirator who has not been freed of
his implication in the conspiracy, thus establishing a "basis" for the
crime. Arising out of this "consistency rule" has come the great vol-
ume of cases in which the courts have held that a conspiracy requires
two guilty parties, Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112 (1932),
and where an indictment for conspiracy names only two parties, an
acquittal or reversal as to one is an acquittal or reversal as to the
other. United States v. Weinberg, 129 F. Supp. 514 (M.D.Pa. 1955).
The above rule is not hard and fast, however, and convictions for
criminal conspiracy have been upheld when a conspirator's associates
were dead, Alkon v. United States, 163 Fed. 810 (Mass. 1908),
not yet tried or unapprehended, United States v. Fox, 130 F.2d 56
(3rd Cir. 1942), unknown, Grove v. United States, 3 F.2d 965
(4th Cir. 1925), or because the jury could not agree as to the guilt
of a co-conspirator. Miller v. United States, 24 F.2d 353 (C.C.A.N.Y.
1928).
A more difficult application of the consistency rule occurs
when a plea of guilty is interposed by one of two persons indicted
for a conspiracy. Under the normal circumstances a plea of guilty
admits all the essential allegations of the indictment, thus relieving
the prosecution of the burden of making proof, and a court which
has jurisdiction of the defendant and of the subject matter has
the power to enter, without conducting an independent hearing to
determine so-called jurisdictional facts, a judgment which cannot
be assailed by collateral attack. United States v. Hoyland, 264 F.2d
346 (7th Cir. 1959); Cf. 62 W. VA. L. REv. 268 (1960). Thus
it would appear that the consistency rule, whether based on logic
or the sense of a just outcome with respect to the very definition
of a conspiracy, would not require the release of A where he is one
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of two conspirators indicted and has entered a plea of guilty, even
though B is later tried and acquitted. A case in support of this
hypothesis is Jones v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. (31 Gratt.) 836
(1878). There X had pleaded guilty to a charge of conspiracy and
the jury had convicted both X and Jones in a joint trial. Jones
applied for a new trial on the basis that the evidence did not support
his conviction. The new trial was granted and Jones released. X
continued to serve his sentence for conspiracy on the basis of his
plea of guilty. There is authority which is contra to the above
hypothesis, however. In The King v. Plummer, 2 K.B. 399 (1902),
the court held that two persons are required to constitute a con-
spiracy and this is true even though one defendant "who pleads
guilty thought that there was [a conspiracy] and the court which
sentenced him accepted that view in lieu of proof."
The time sequence is of the utmost importance in the prose-
cution for a conspiracy. Thus, in the principal case, D was permitted
to enter his plea of guilty after the court was aware that his co-
conspirator had been acquitted of the charge. The time sequence
enters the picture in this manner: after the acquittal of D's co-
conspirator, which arises first; the release of the conspiracy charge
against D or the acceptance of the guilty plea tendered by D? If
the acceptance of the guilty plea came first, the Arizona court
clearly erred in its holding. A guilty plea differs from a mere
admission or extrajudicial confession and of itself constitutes a con-
viction and is conclusive. Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487
(1962). The commission of the crime and the jurisdiction of the
court are admitted by a plea of guilty. Commonwealth ex rel.
Ritchey v. McHugh, 189 Pa. Super. 515, 151 A.2d 659 (1959).
D would not have been entitled to raise jurisdictional questions on
appeal. However, the situation in the principal case actually was
that the duty of the court to dismiss the conspiracy charge against
D arose before he was permitted to enter his plea of guilty. The
Arizona court, therefore, had no choice other than to rule as it did.
As has been held many times, two persons are necessary to form
a conspiracy and therefore, the acquittal of one person indicted
requires the acquittal of the other person indicted in the absence of
evidence implicating another party. United States v. Gordon, 242
F.2d 122 (3rd Cir. 1957). (Emphasis added). The inclusion of
the word "requires" seems to impose a duty on the courts when the
situation in question arises. In view of its holding in the principal
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case, the Arizona court would apparently be in accord with the
case cited.
It would appear that the principal case presents an area where
the consistency rule should not be applied. The failure of the
prosecution to satisfy the jury of A's guilt in the first trial does not
negate the existence of the conspiracy nor logically preclude a finding
by the jury in B's trial that the offense has been committed. The
moral concept of fairness which helped bring about the consistency
rule could be as well satisfied if the rule were restricted to cases in
which A is acquitted either in the same trial in which B is convicted
or in a prior trial. In Sherman v. State, 113 Neb. 173, 302 N.W.
413 (1925), the court held that even though an alleged conspirator
had already been tried, convicted, and sentenced in a separate trial,
he must be discharged if and when his alleged co-conspirator is
later acquitted. To hold otherwise, said the court, would be to rob
the judgments of "that sweet aspect of consistency and truth which
is one of their most admirable attributes." The practical consequences
of such an application of the consistency rule are to allow a defendant
the benefits of two different trials-his own and that of his co-
conspirator. The verdict of a second jury may prevail over that of
the first and even, with the aid of habeas corpus, render the conse-
quences of the previous proceeding a nullity. Thus the prosecution
is imposed with the greatly increased burden of proving the guilt of
a defendant to twenty-four jurors rather than the normal twelve
before the case against either of the defendants may be disposed of
with any degree of finality. Granted, the accused should be given
the entire benefit of any advantage the law may allow in a criminal
proceeding, but when an accused has received a fair trial he seems
entitled to no more.
The dissenting opinion in the principal case objects to the
dismissal of the charge against D after he had made a "bargain with
the prosecution and the court." Even though the weight of sympathy
may be with the minority opinion, the weight of authority appears
to. be with the majority. At any rate, the fraud which was practiced
upon the court in the principal case could have been avoided and
both the majority and minority satisfied by a restriction of the
consistency rule in this situation.
Ralph Charles Dusic, Jr.
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